THOMPSON, Chief Justice.
Appellant Charles Warren was indicted for violating OCGA § 16-12-81, with the indictment alleging that he sent an unsolicited text message containing an image of his genitalia to an adult female without notifying her that the message contained nudity. Appellant filed a general demurrer, arguing that § 16-12-81 does not criminalize his conduct, and three motions to quash the indictment, raising various constitutional challenges to the statute. The trial court denied appellant's demurrer and his motions to quash, and he now appeals. Appellant is correct that OCGA § 16-12-81 does not criminalize his conduct. The trial court therefore erred in denying his general demurrer. Because the
1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his general demurrer to the indictment, because the act alleged in the indictment — the sending of a nude image of his genitals from his cell phone to the victim's cell phone — is not prohibited by OCGA § 16-12-81. We agree.
"When analyzing a general demurrer, the question is whether a defendant can admit to the conduct and still be innocent of the crime." Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534, 538, 615 S.E.2d 512 (2005). OCGA § 16-12-81(a), which was enacted in 1970, see Ga. L.1970, p. 173, provides that:
To start, we note that OCGA § 16-12-81 is not inapplicable to electronic text messaging merely because that form of communication did not exist when § 16-12-81 was enacted in 1970. See Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18, 22, 30 S.E.2d 866 (1944) (holding that a "provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption," but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision, the constitutional provision applies to them). Because the words of OCGA § 16-12-81 at issue here are not "words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter," we look to the ordinary meaning of those words at the time the General Assembly enacted the statute in deciding whether the sending of an intangible text message comes within the scope of the statute. See OCGA § 1-3-1(b) ("In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter."); Collins, 198 Ga. at 22, 30 S.E.2d 866. See also Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 870, 187 L.Ed.2d 729, 738 (2014) (holding that, "`unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning'" at the time Congress enacted a statute and reviewing dictionaries from the era of the statute's enactment to assist in determining its meaning (citation omitted)). Moreover, under the canon of noscitur a sociis, the words in OCGA § 16-12-81(a) should be understood in relation to each other, since "`[w]ords', like people, are judged by the company they keep." Hill v. Owens, 292 Ga. 380, 383, 738 S.E.2d 56 (2013).
The statute contains a specific prohibition against sending unsolicited through the mail material depicting nudity or sexual conduct without the required notice, followed by a more general prohibition against "otherwise unsolicited caus[ing] to be delivered material depicting nudity or sexual conduct to [a] person" without the statutory notice. The specific prohibition is clearly aimed at tangible material that is delivered in a tangible manner, see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1361 (1966) (defining
Considering the general prohibition in relation to the other words of the statute, we conclude that the general prohibition is limited in the same manner as the specific. The notice provision of the statute says that the notice "must be imprinted on the envelope or container of such material." "Such material" clearly refers to the "material depicting nudity or sexual conduct" described in the specific and general prohibitions of the statute. Thus, the statute contemplates that the "material" that is the subject of both prohibitions has an envelope or container that can have the notice imprinted on it. At the time OCGA § 16-12-81 was enacted, an "envelope" was defined as "something that envelopes: wrapper, container, receptacle" and as "a flat flexible usu[ally] paper container in many sizes and constructions made by die cutting and gluing with an overlapped back seam and with bottom and closure flaps both adhering to the back portion," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 759 (1966), and a "container" was defined as "one that contains: as ... a receptacle (as a box or jar) or a formed or flexible covering for the packing or shipment of articles, goods, or commodities." Id. at 491. In addition, "imprint" meant "to mark by pressure (as a figure on an object or as the object itself with the figure)." Id. at 1137. Given their ordinary meaning, these words indicate that the general prohibition of OCGA § 16-12-81, like the specific prohibition, addresses tangible material that has a tangible envelope or container on which the required notice can be imprinted.
Finally, to the extent that it can be argued that after applying the traditional canons of statutory construction, it is unclear whether the statute applies to appellant's conduct, the rule of lenity would require us to give him the benefit of the doubt. See Harris v. State, 286 Ga. 245, 253, 686 S.E.2d 777 (2009).
Judgment reversed.
HINES, P.J., BENHAM, HUNSTEIN, NAHMIAS, BLACKWELL, JJ., and Judge ELIZABETH L. BRANCH concur.
MELTON, J., not participating.